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Abstract 
Intelligent agents are systems that have a complex, ongoing interaction with an environment 
that is dynamic and imperfectly predictable. Agents are typically difficult o program because 
the correctness of a program depends on the details of how the agent is situated in its environ- 
ment. In this paper, we present a methodology for the design of situated agents that is based on 
situated-automata theory. This approach allows designers to describe the informational content of 
an agent’s computational states in a semantically rigorous way without requiring a commitment 
to conventional run-time symbolic processing. We start by outlining this situated view of repre- 
sentation, then show how it contributes to design methodologies for building systems that track 
perceptual conditions and take purposeful actions in their environments. 
1. Introduction 
Humans, delivery robots, and automated factories are all systems that have an in- 
telligent, ongoing interaction with environments hat are dynamic and imperfectly pre- 
dictable. Such systems are often called situated agents. They constitute an important 
class of systems that are very difficult to program because of their close interaction with 
the environment in which they are situated. Specifications of correctness for situated 
agents amount o specifications of their interactions with the environment: what action 
should the agent take when the environment is in a particular configuration? Programs 
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for situated agents must allow them to respond appropriately to diverse, rapidly changing 
situations. 
The emphasis on an agent’s connection to its environment is an important change 
from that of traditional theories of representation and control. In this paper, we present 
an informal overview of a particular methodology for the design of situated agents. 
This methodology, based on situated-automata theory [ 14,161, allows system designers 
to use high-level symbolic languages to describe the informational content of agents 
without requiring the symbolic structures to be implemented in the agent. It has become 
folk wisdom that “situated agents” and “representation” are incompatible concepts. In 
our view, this is not at all the case, and we feel there is much to gain from analyzing 
the semantics of representations from a situated perspective. In this spirit, we start by 
outlining this situated view of representation, then show how it contributes to design 
methodologies for building systems that track perceptual conditions and take purposeful 
actions in their environments. 
2. Situated representation 
Our ultimate aim, in designing and building situated agents, is to have them perform 
a rich set of tasks correctly; that is, at each moment to carry out actions that are 
appropriate to their situations and goals. In order to specify correct behavior, and then 
to show that a particular program will satisfy that specification, we need to make precise 
the relationship between internal states of an agent and conditions in its environment. 
Once this relationship is made precise, we can give clear specifications of desired 
behavior for an agent in an environment and then generate a program for manipulating 
the internal states of the agent that satisfies those specifications. 
For example, suppose we are designing an agent whose task it is to water a plant if 
and only if it is dry. From the outset, we must take into account the interaction between 
the agent and the environment: the specification of our problem contains a statement 
about the agent, water the plant, and a statement about the environment, when it is dry. 
In order to design such a controller, we must have a systematic way of talking about 
the relationship between the agent and its environment. 
2.1. Existing approaches 
There has been a variety of approaches to describing the relationship between agents 
and their environments. 
Many simple embedded systems are designed according to the principles of control 
theory. These systems usually have very little internal state, which typically consists 
of estimates of a set of real-valued variables that describe the state of the environment 
directly in parametric form. The designer of the control system chooses the real-world 
quantities upon which correct control responses depend, then designs machinery to 
estimate those quantities inside the agent based on incoming sensory signals. The control 
actions taken by the agent depend on the estimates of the quantities. This approach works 
well when the agent’s interaction with the environment can be described by simple 
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continuous functions and when the quantities that must be estimated can be sensed 
fairly directly. As agents and their environments become more complex, more abstract 
information will have to be represented, and this approach will no longer suffice. 
In the artificial intelligence community, an agent’s information about the state of its 
environment is typically represented symbolically. A formal language is developed by 
the system’s designer, including an intended semantics that relates sentences stored in 
the agent’s memory to the propositions about the world that they denote. This approach 
is applicable to arbitrarily complex relationships between states of the agent and the 
world, but it can be computationally intractable to maintain such a representation. 
Many researchers have found it useful to provide ascriptional accounts of the re- 
lationship between states of an agent and states of the environment. McCarthy [lo], 
for example, speaks of attributing knowledge of the temperature to a thermostat, and 
Newell [ 121 gives a definition of knowledge of an agent in terms of what would have 
to be true in the world in order for that agent’s actions to be rational (in service of 
some goal). More formal notions of an agent’s having knowledge about its environment 
are found in the work on epistemic logic: Moore [ 1 I] uses epistemic logic to model 
the knowledge of one agent about another’s knowledge for the purpose of asking ques- 
tions, for example. Halpem and Moses [2] provide a concrete computational model of 
knowledge in their applications of epistemic logic to the formalization of communica- 
tion protocols in distributed systems. We use an approach similar to that of Halpern 
and Moses for specifying embedded agents, finding the concept of knowledge to be an 
effective way of describing the relationship between agent and environment. 
2.2. The situated-automata model 
Traditional theories of computation are based on the notion of computation as com- 
putation of a function. The inputs are presented to the computational process, it works 
for some amount of time, then generates the answer and terminates. There is only one 
question and only one answer; of course, the question can be arbitrarily complex, poten- 
tially including many simple questions, but once the computation has started, it cannot 
be changed. 
2.2.1. Interaction model 
It is more appropriate to think of an agent embedded in an environment as performing 
a transduction. It has a stream of inputs from the environment and generates a stream 
of outputs or actions to the environment. For the purposes of this work, we model the 
coupling between the agent and the environment as that of a pair of automata that are 
operating synchronously with one another; that is, their interaction can be seen as taking 
alternating turns, with the world generating an input (or “perception”) to the agent, 
then the agent generating an output (or “action”) to the world. In order to make this 
synchronous interaction a plausible model of interacting with a dynamic environment, 
we require the agent to generate actions, without fail, at strictly timed intervals. 
In the transduction model, then, an agent is viewed as an automaton that generates a 
mapping from inputs to outputs, mediated by its internal state. Fig. 1 shows the coupling 
of the agent and its environment. We note in passing that although there is only one agent 
152 S.J. Rosenschein, L.l? Kaelbling/Art@cial Intelligence 73 (1995) 149-I 73 
Fig. I. Interaction between agent and environment. 
in this model, most interesting environments have large numbers of agents. From the 
perspective of this model, however, all of the other agents, whether robotic or biological, 
are taken to be part of the environment. This gives us a way to discuss the properties 
of a single agent from its perspective. 
2.2.2. Correlational deJnition of information 
Agent tasks are often specified in the form: when P is true of the state of the 
environment, then the agent should take action A. This specification could only be 
implemented immediately if the agent had direct access to arbitrary properties of the 
world. In general, that is not the case. Because an agent’s actions in reality can only 
depend on its inputs and internal state, agent programs must ultimately be expressed in 
the form: when P’ is true of the state of the agent, then the agent should take action A. 
Our problem, then, is to give a systematic account of the relationship between P and 
P’; if we can find some P’ that implies P, then taking action A when P’ holds of the 
agent’s state is sufficient to satisfy the specification. 
One way to view this relationship is in terms of a correlation between states of the 
agent and states of the external world. We will say that when an agent x is in state u, 
it carries the information that 9 if and only if whenever it is in state u, 4p is true in the 
world. This definition was originally articulated [ 141 in terms of equivalence classes of 
strings that would leave an automaton in the same state. 
Given this definition, we can specify the simple robot plant-watering task more pre- 
cisely: whenever the agent carries the information that the plant is dry, it should water 
the plant. Of course, as it stands, this is a fairly weak specification. For example, it 
could be satisfied trivially by any agent whose internal state is simply uncorrelated with 
the state of the plant. To rule out such a consequence, we might require further that the 
agent track whether the plant is dry: that is, if the plant is dry, the agent should carry 
the information that it is dry, and if it is not dry, the agent should carry the information 
that it is not dry. These two informational requirements taken together specify an agent 
that will water the plant if and only if it is dry. 
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Hg. 2. Circuit model of a finite-state machine. 
2.2.3. Circuit model of computation 
We motivated the concept of information as a way to describe the relation between 
internal states of an agent and the external state of the world. In this section, we will 
introduce a way of describing the structure of agents and their internal states. 
Considering an agent as an automaton does not, in itself, give us much help in its 
design or analysis. We take a finer-grained view here, considering an agent o be made 
up of parts, called locations, each of which is capable of assuming a set of local states 
(or “values”) over time. The set of possible global states of the agent, then, will be the 
cross-product of the local state sets of the atomic locations. 
A machine is a set of locations whose values depend on one another over time. 
We can construct arbitrarily complex machines from machines of two primitive types: 
pure functions and delays. Pure function machines consist of two (possibly complex) 
locations and specify the values of one location (the output) as a function of the values 
of the other (the input). Delay machines also consist of two locations, but constrain the 
values of the output location to be the values that the input location had on the previous 
tick. 3 
Given a network of delay and function elements, complete with feedback connections, 
it is possible to organize it into a circuit of the form shown in Fig. 2, in which there is a 
state-update function, f, that maps the input and the old value of the internal state into 
a new value of the internal state, and an output function, g, that maps the input and the 
old value of the internal state into the output. It is often useful to think of the internal 
state as being a “state vector” containing the state of all the individual delay elements 
in the machine. 
Although these definitions can be satisfied by machines made up of infinitely many 
locations, each of which can take on infinitely many values, we will focus our attention 
on machines with finite sets of atomic locations, each of which can take on only a finite 
set of values. 
One obvious model for this abstract notion of machine exists in the form of digital 
hardware: locations correspond to wires, function machines correspond to logic gates, 
3 We use “tick” to mean one discrete time unit. 
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and delay machines correspond to flip-flops or registers. As is well known, any finite- 
state transduction can be carried out by a network of such basic components. 
2.3. Consequences of the situated-automata model 
Although the correlational model of information can be used directly without the 
need for logical formalism, we have found it useful to adopt a logical framework, with 
a suitable syntax and semantics, for its application. In this section, we describe a logical 
formalization of the situated-automata model, then consider some insights it gives us 
into the nature of situated representation. 
2.3.1. Formalization of the model 
We have adopted logic as a means of describing the structure of machines, character- 
izing their interactions with the environment, and stating criteria for their correctness. 
This use of logic as a specification language is independent of its use as an imple- 
mentation strategy. This is crucial because machines with complex logical descriptions 
often have very simple implementations and vice versa. Because a location x, in a cer- 
tain state, carries information about any proposition that is true whenever x is in that 
state, there can be an infinity of propositions 9 such that x carries the information that 
p. Those propositions could not all be written down and manipulated symbolically. A 
simple example will illustrate this point. Consider a machine that consists of a single 
and gate. Behaviorally, the device is very simple: the output of the machine is 1 if and 
only if both its inputs are 1. Semantically, it may be more involved: if a 1 at the first 
input carries the information that p and a 1 at the second input carries the conditional 
information that ‘p 4 @, then whenever the output location has value 1, it carries the 
information that +. The inference rule modus ponens is not implemented in the machine, 
but it can be applied freely to reason about the information that locations of the machine 
have about the state of the world. 
The correlational definition of information, introduced in Section 2.2.2, can be directly 
formalized in epistemic logic [ 161, using the form K(x, p) to indicate that agent x 
carries the information that cp. This definition of information induces an equivalence 
relation on possible worlds, thus giving rise to an accessibility relation satisfying the S5 
axioms [3]: 
K(x, PD) ---f P (truth), 
K(x,qo + fJ) 4 (K(x,cp) -+ K(x,+)) (consequential closure), 
K(x, 40) + K(x, K(x, P)) (positive introspection), 
TK(X, 40) * K(x, +(x3 PO) 1 (negative introspection). 
We view an agent as the union of all of its locations, so states of agents are comprised 
of states of component locations. We find it useful to apply the K operator not only to 
the agent as a whole, but also to its constituent locations. Information can be carried 
in simple locations or in compound locations, and aggregating locations leads us to an 
important corollary of the axioms, the principle of spatial monotonic@: an aggregate 
location carries the conjunction of the information carried by its constituent locations: 
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The formal model can be used to prove correctness properties of agents: given a 
description of the circuit that makes up the agent and a description of the informational 
properties of the inputs to the agent, it can, for example, be shown that the outputs 
have certain informational properties [ 16 1. This constitutes a correctness proof for an 
embedded agent. 
2.3.2. Properties of representations 
In both standard programming methods and AI inference systems, the semantics of 
machine states is typically stipulated: the designer of the machine has a particular 
meaning in mind for values in designated locations and strives to construct the machine 
so that those stipulated semantics will hold. The situated-automata view allows us to 
attribute semantics to values in locations more “objectively” based on the correlational 
definition of knowledge. In the following sections, we examine aspects of the relationship 
between these two kinds of semantics. 
Time is meaning 
The correlational definition of knowledge assigns information content to locations at 
a point in time as a function of the value they contain at that time and the world states 
with which that value can co-occur. One immediate consequence of this definition is that 
a location containing a value at time t and continuing to hold that value until time t + k 
will be assigned as its information content the disjunction of world conditions satisfied 
at any time instant in the interval [t, t + k]. Unless the designer has taken special care 
to design mechanisms for updating values in time to track external change, the objective 
information at a location may not be what he intended at all. For example, consider 
a robot that senses an object, stores the sensor reading, which the designer takes to 
be a representation of the distance to that object, and only updates the state every 10 
seconds. The actual information content of the stored representation all along will in all 
likelihood not be what was intended but some weaker (though not necessarily vacuous) 
proposition that bounds the distance to the object, depending on the possible maximum 
relative velocity between the robot and the object. 
Given the situated view of knowledge, this is not very surprising; but standard AI 
systems often operate in a way that does not take seriously the degradation of information 
over time. They get certain sensory inputs that are written down symbolically in the 
memory of the machine and manipulated over time. Even if the stipulated semantics of 
the formulae were true when the process began, it is entirely possible that the world 
will change enough during the course of the inference process that the data on which 
the conclusions were based are no longer valid. 
Machines that manipulate symbols 
The situated-automata framework can also be applied to computations that perform 
symbol manipulation. The requirement that intended semantics match real ones is empha- 
sized in symbolic systems. It is possible, in theory, to design a system that manipulates 
symbolic representations of propositional information about the world in such a way that 
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a proposition is only symbolically written in memory when it is justified by the corre- 
lational theory; that is, when those locations carry that same propositional information. 
This can be achieved through careful use of time stamps and axioms that describe the 
dynamics of the world, but it has proven very difficult in practice and is rarely done. 
It is interesting to consider, in more detail, an example illustrating two different ways 
of encoding information. In the first case, we dedicate a particular bit in a machine 
to the representation of whether there is an obstacle within two meters of the agent; 
if it is on, then there is an obstacle and if it is off, it is not known whether there is 
an obstacle. In the second approach, the symbols distance (robot, obstacle) < 2 
(or symbols in some other language with compositional semantics) can be written 
anywhere in memory and, if the system is designed properly, those locations will carry 
the same information as the single bit of the first example being on. In the first case, we 
say that the information is encoded “by location”; that particular bit is devoted to the 
representation of a single condition, so the location of the encoding of the bit is crucial. 
In the second case, the information is encoded “by value”; the values of the locations 
involved in representing the information are crucial, but that same combination of values 
occurring at any location would carry the same information. 
To see how a correctly functioning symbolic representation system yields the correct 
correlational semantics, consider a very simple language with symbols of two types: 
unary predicates (e.g., fully-charged, red, tired, distant) and individual constants 
(e.g., robot 1, ba1137, john, wa112). Sentences in this language could be represented 
by simple juxtaposition of symbols as in this sequence: 
[fully-charged robot1 red ball37 tired jobn distant wall21 . 
While the correlational account of information assigns time-varying propositions as 
the meanings of a value at a location, under a more standard Tarskian account, these 
symbols might be interpreted differently: the unary predicates might denote mappings 
from individuals to temporally-indexical propositions (e.g., mappings from time to truth 
values), while individual constants might denote individuals (or perhaps temporally- 
indexical individuals). Note that if the representation is uniformly veridical, that is, 
if the sentence is in memory only when it is true, then at the level of propositions, 
the two semantics agree. Importantly, however, the situated-automata framework would 
have attached that meaning to the symbol sequence whether or not the designer had that 
Tarskian semantics in mind. In other words, the attribution of semantic content need not 
be externally stipulated. 
There is clearly a trade-off between using these two kinds of representation (and 
a whole spectrum of intermediate cases). When information is represented largely by 
location, the number of bits or atomic locations used can be very small, making this 
form of representation quite efficient. Symbolic representations are notoriously space- 
inefficient, requiring many bits to encode syntactically the propositional content to be 
represented. However, these representations are also very flexible. When storing infor- 
mation by value, any proposition expressible in the language can be represented; when 
storing information by location, on the other hand, each individual proposition must 
be thought of in advance by the designer of the machine (or, as we will see, by a 
compilation system). 
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Fig. 3. Pure-action case. 
As observed above, when a location carries the information that P, so does every 
super-location; there is a minimal location that carries the information that P. We will 
say that information is localized to a minimal location that carries it. An especially 
important consideration in the decision between encoding by value and by location is 
the amount of work that must be done to localize important information. In order to take 
a particular action when P is true, the locations that control the effector must eventually 
carry the information that P; it is insufficient for that information to be encoded in some 
collection of locations in a uniformly-interpreted memory. The amount of work that has 
to be done to take the information that P and localize it into the effector bits, or any 
other location where it might be further combined with other information, can crucially 
depend on how it was initially represented. When information is encoded by value, it 
can often take many complex operations of indexing and pattern matching to localize; 
information that is encoded by location can often be used directly. Such considerations 
should guide the representational choices that are made in designing and building agents. 
3. Designing agents 
Given the situated view of agents and environments as interacting automata nd the 
circuit model of computation, we can build a design methodology for agents situated 
in dynamic environments. We first consider the case in which the agent has no internal 
state, then the case in which the agent monitors, but does not affect, the environment. 
We conclude by combining our design methodologies for an entire agent. 
3.1. Pure action 
We begin by considering control in a very simple setting, namely stimulus-response 
systems that map current inputs to outputs without any dependence on prior inputs. At 
each instant, the inputs carry information about the immediate state of the environment, 
but the agent has no internal memory by which to distinguish otherwise similar states 
through residues of past experiences. In the automaton model, the state set of a stimulus- 
response automaton contains only one state, and inputs are simply passed on to the output 
relation. This is illustrated schematically in Fig. 3. Although stimulus-response agents 
are extremely limited, they are complete agents, nonetheless, and constitute a relatively 
easy-to-analyze starting point. 
By what criteria can a stimulus-response system, or any action-selection system, 
be judged successful? A natural way to answer this question is to relativize success to 
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some stated goal specification that is taken to be part of the problem statement, Different 
families of control problems arise, depending on what is meant by the term “goal”. 
One dimension of variability in defining goals is whether the goals are fixed or dy- 
namic. With fixed goals (or design-time goals), action-selection mappings are evaluated 
relative to the entire trajectory of states they engender. To model an agent as pursuing dy- 
namic goals, on the other hand, assumes some method for defining moment-to-moment 
variations in what the agent seeks. Even with dynamic goals, the agent is seen as having 
at least the fixed goal of acting rationally, that is, at each moment selecting actions 
consistent with its current goals and information. (Interesting subtleties arise in patho- 
logical situations where agents might preserve rationality by choosing not to want or 
not to know.) 
Another dimension of variability in goal definition arises from the complexity of the 
goal and the form in which it is expressed. Goals can vary in complexity from that 
of maintaining simple environmental invariants, to satisfying arbitrary temporal predi- 
cates, to optimizing complex numerical evaluation criteria (e.g., maximize throughput 
while minimizing energy, with complex trade-offs). Regarding the form of presentation, 
complexity can vary from a simple enumeration of states, for goals of maintenance, 
to complex formulas in expressive logical languages, closed under Boolean operations, 
quantification, and rich temporal operators. 
Because, in extreme cases, agent synthesis can be intractable, it is not a reasonable 
objective to try to develop universal solution methods. Rather, it is preferable to develop 
a methodology for specifying particular action strategies, and to develop an inventory 
of solved special cases that can expedite agent construction in practica1 situations. As 
with goal specification, the specification of action-selection mappings can take many 
forms, direct and indirect. One family of direct methods includes notations for defining 
functions of one or more input variables in a suitable language, such as look-up tables 
(only in very simple cases), functional expressions, circuit descriptions, or data-flow 
graphs. A related family of methods uses the calculus of relations rather than functional 
expressions, in some cases with a determinization operator applied as the last step, after 
the output relation has been composed by applying operations like union, intersection, 
and restriction to primitive relations. The base-level relations can be represented either 
enumeratively or in more compact form. 
Rex [4,8] is a language for specifying action mappings (as well as machines with 
internal state) as abstract circuit descriptions. Rex served as a substrate for Gapps [ 5,7 1, 
which takes a symbolic specification of an action mapping and compiles it into fixed 
run-time circuitry. A Gapps program consists of a set of goal reduction rules, which 
specify how a high-level goal is transformed to a more specific and simpler low-level 
goal. When given a fixed goal to satisfy, the Gapps compiler generates a provably correct 
(though possibly partial) reactive program (input-to-output map) for that goal. A Gapps 
program is guaranteed to be correct, but not necessarily complete; if it outputs an action, 
it is appropriate to the situation, but it will not necessarily output an action in every 
situation. One of the main strengths of Gapps is its least-commitment approach: if many 
low-level actions satisfy a particular goal, they are all returned as part of the result, 
which allows nondeterministic choice of action; this greatly simplifies the compositional 
construction of programs that satisfy multiple goals. 
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Although Gapps programs are specified using symbolic rules, they still require the 
programmer to do a great deal of the work, especially in determining what chains of 
actions will result in desired outcomes. Gapps does not support the reduction of goals 
into sequences of action, so the programmer has to maintain any such commitments 
himself based on perceived conditions. In many cases, we would like programs to be 
derived from much more abstract specifications. 
3.1. I. Maintaining invariants through goal regression 
Indirect methods define the action-selection mapping by deriving it from some descrip- 
tion of the environment and the goal, whether in the form of an explicit combinatorial 
object like a graph, or in the form of declarative assertions, such as operator descriptions 
found in classical AI planning systems. To illustrate how a stimulus-response agent can 
be constructed algorithmically from an explicit description of an environment and goal, 
we consider the special case of agents that maintain invariants. Although the method 
illustrated does not scale well with large state sets, it does introduce important concepts 
and build up intuitions about properties of action strategies. 
A stimulus-response agent that maintains invariants can be synthesized as follows. 
Let the environment be represented as a nondeterministic automaton (S, P, A, init, Y, out), 
where 
l S is a finite set of states of the environment; 
l P is a finite set of outputs (these are usefully viewed as percepts from the agent’s 
perspective) ;
l A is a finite set of actions that the agent can generate as input to the environment; 
l init is a set of states containing the one that the environment is known to be in 
initially; 
l Y is a relation on S x A x S where v ( SI, a, S.L) holds if it is possible for the world 
to make a transition from state si to state s2 when action a is generated by the 
agent; and 
l out is a function mapping S to P 
For the simple pure-action case, we assume that the environment automaton outputs 
its full state as output. In other words, the percept set P is identical to the state set S 
and out is the identity function on states. Let the goal be represented by G, a subset of 
S, that the agent is to maintain as an invariant condition. 
A solution to this problem is G*, a subset of G within which the environment can 
be made to stay indefinitely, and a mapping from G* to A, specifying the actions the 
agent should take in order to stay within G*. The set G* can be computed iteratively, 
as follows: 
Let Go := G 
For n = 0 to . . . 
Let G,+i = 0 
For all g E G, 
If 3a.Vg’. u(g, a, g’) -+ g’ E G, then 
add g to G”+l 
When G, = G,+r, terminate and return G,. 
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Each intermediate set G, is the set of states from which G can be maintained for at 
least n steps. For any state g E G, if there exists an action such that from every possible 
successor state g’, G can be maintained for n steps, then in state g, G can be maintained 
for IZ + I steps. This step is called “goal regression”, because G,,+i is the weakest 
precondition under which G, can be made true on the next step (see Rosenschein [ 131 
or Waldinger [ 171 for a more complete description of regression-based planning). When 
this process reaches a fixed point, then we have determined the set, G* of states from 
which G can be maintained indefinitely. In order to maintain G* from some state g, the 
agent can do any action a such that ‘v’g’.v(g,a,g’) --+ g’ E G*. 
3.1.2. Goal regression example 
Consider a simple domain in which a robot must keep plants alive by watering them. 
The action set of the robot contains actions to water each plant and no-op, the action 
that does nothing. The state of the world can be expressed as a vector describing the 
moisture level of each plant, where 4 is wet (just watered) and 0 is dead. For example, 
the vector (4 3 0) describes a situation in which the first plant is wet, the second 
slightly drier, and the third is dead. Moisture decreases by one every time step on which 
the plant is not watered. Plants that die (reach moisture level 0) stay dead forever. 
We consider a situation in which there are three plants and the goal is to maintain the 
condition “no plants are dead”; G is enumerated below (with equivalent states under 
different orderings of plants deleted, because the identity of the individuals is irrelevant 
to the maintenance of this goal): 
(4 4 4) (4 4 3) (4 4 2) (4 4 1) (4 3 3) (4 3 2) (4 3 1) (4 2 2) 
(4 2 1) (4 1 1) (3 3 3) (3 3 2) (3 3 1) (3 2 2) (3 2 1) (3 1 1) 
(2 2 2) (2 2 1) (2 I 1) (1 1 1) 
The G* resulting from the goal regression algorithm is: 
(4 4 4) (4 4 3) (4 4 2) (4 4 1) (4 3 3) (4 3 2) (4 3 1) (4 2 2) 
(4 2 1) (3 3 3) (3 3 2) (3 3 1) (3 2 2) (3 2 1) 
The most constrained state in G’ is (3 2 1). By watering the plant at moisture level 
1, it is changed to (4 2 11, and then to (4 3 11, and then to (4 3 2). At this point, 
the no-op action is allowed, and the robot can rest, leading to the original starting state 
of (3 2 1). Note that there are no states in G* with two plants at level 1 or three at 
level 2; although these states are in G (no plants are currently dead), they are not in 
G*, because it is not possible to keep all the plants from dying in the future. 
3.1.3. Discussion 
As mentioned above, this construction does not scale well as the number of envi- 
ronment states increases, and this motivates the use of other representations. Although 
ordinarily used to handle run-time goals of achievement, the declarative operator de- 
scriptions used in AI planning systems encode the same information as state-transition 
graphs, and can be used to drive the construction above. Operator descriptions provide 
a more intuitively interpretable form of expression and can often be manipulated more 
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Perception 
Fig. 4. The pure-perception case. 
efficiently because they refer to large subspaces of the state space with terse symbolic 
labels. Rather than calculating G* through enumeration, operator descriptions allow it 
to be calculated through symbolic regression. This may be more or less efficient that 
the alternative, depending on specifics of the problem domain. This technique has been 
implemented and explored as an extension to the Gapps programming system [ 61. 
3.2. Pure perception 
Until now we have assumed that inputs from the environment are sufficiently informa- 
tive, in that they encode all the world-state information eeded to drive action. In cases 
where less information is available, the inputs to action selection must be derived by 
accumulating partial information over time, and for this purpose additional machinery is 
necessary. We refer to this additional machinery as the “perception system” and explore 
its properties in this section. 
As in the case of action selection, it will be useful to approach perception by beginning 
with a study of the pure phenomenon. By pure perception we mean agent-environment 
systems in which the outputs of the agent have no influence on the environment at 
all, and the agent is simply a tracking system, or monitor: a passive observer, seeing, 
but not seen by, the environment. This special type of agent, again, will be of limited 
practical use but does illustrates the essential features of information extraction. The 
set-up for pure perception is illustrated in Fig. 4. The lack of influence of the agent on 
the environment cannot be depicted graphically; the environment’s next state function is 
independent of the output of the agent. 
The focus in analyzing the perception system is on the kind of correspondence main- 
tained between its internal states and states of the environment. This correspondence, 
in fact, is a form of invariant of exactly the type investigated in the previous section, 
but over the states of the agent-environment pair rather than just the environment. Even 
when the environment is indifferent o the actions of the agent, it makes sense to ask 
how the perception component might be designed to maximize the degree of correlation 
between its states and those of environment, hence maximizing its information. 
To see this most clearly, consider an environment, modeled once again as a nondeter- 
ministic automaton (S, P, A, init, Y, out). What is the maximum amount of information 
encoded in an instantaneous percept? In general, the best we can do is to associate 
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with each percept p the set of environment states with which it is compatible (i.e., 
those s such that out(s) = p). What is the maximum amount of information about the 
environment that could be accumulated by the agent automaton over time? Given a rich 
enough inventory of internal states, a pure-perception agent could optimally track the 
environment by having states isomorphic to the powerset of environment’s states. Let 
2 = powerset( S) be the set of internal states of the agent, with the agent in state gi if 
and only if every world state s t ~i is consistent with the agent’s perceptual history so 
far. The agent’s initial state is the set of possible initial states of the environment, init, 
and its transition function N( (T, a, p) which maps the previous internal state u, the last 
action a, and the last percept p, into a new internal state, is given by 
N(cr,p,a) = {s’ / 3s E v.v( s, a, s’) A out(s) = p}. 
This powerset automaton might be cumbersome, indeed, but its tracking behavior would 
be optimal. 
Although as the number of environment states rises, the powerset construction quickly 
becomes infeasible, it is useful as a thought experiment because much of its value can be 
preserved through efficient but information-rich approximations. Mathematically, these 
approximations are homomorphic images of the ideal powerset automaton, and thus are 
consistent with, but not as complete as, that ideal, or optimal, tracker. Nevertheless, these 
homomorphic images allow useful information to be monitored, while carefully trading 
off computational space and time, under the designer’s control. One simple approach to 
constructing homomorphic projections of the powerset automaton is to choose a set of 
interesting or significant states in the powerset automaton, and close these under union 
and intersection. The result is a lattice, which will be a sub-lattice of the powerset 
Boolean algebra. The construction of the initial state and transition function of the 
perception system then proceeds as in the case of the powerset automaton above, but 
with the true powerset elements approximated by least upper bounds in the sub-lattice. 
For example, if in the original powerset automaton the transition function maps a state to 
a successor state that is not an element of the homomorphic-image lattice, the element 
of that lattice which best approximates the successor state will be returned instead. 
Thus the lattice transition function approximates the optimal transition function and 
degrades gracefully with the precision of the representation. The lattices themselves 
would typically be Cartesian products of simpler lattices, with elements that could be 
represented compactly as parameter vectors. 
This technique forms the basis of the RULER system [ 151. RULER takes an approach 
analogous in many ways to AI planning systems. In RULER, the environment is described 
by a set of assertions, including temporal assertions that describe conditions that are 
either true initially or that will be true in the next state, depending on current conditions. 
The RULER compiler synthesizes perceptual machinery (an initial state and next state 
function) by chaining together these individual assertions, not with a view toward 
constructing action sequences, but rather with a view toward computing descriptive 
parameters in the next state’s world model. The use of lattices as the semantic domain 
of interpretation of the model parameters, along with effectively closing the parameter 
space under intersection, allows incremental information to be folded in nicely and leads 
to a compositional methodology for constructing perceptual update mechanisms. 
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RULER'S compilation method works as follows. The compiler takes as input a descrip- 
tion of information carried by the run-time inputs to the program and the internal state 
variables, as well as a background theory containing temporal facts about the world. 
The compiler operates by deriving theorems about what is true initially and about what 
will be true at any time, given what was true at the previous time. In the course of the 
derivation, free variables are instantiated in the manner of logic programming systems. 
From the instantiated formulas, the compiler extracts a program for initializing and 
updating a state vector with the desired informational properties. 
More precisely, the compiler’s inputs consist of the following: 
0 a list [al, . . . . a,] of input locations, 
0 a list [bt,..., b,] of internal state locations, 
l for each input location a, a formula P,(U) with free variable U, 
l for each internal location b, a formula Pb( U) with free variable U and a function 
Konjb, 
l a finite set r of facts. 
The formulas Px( U) express propositions parameterized by 17, where U ranges over 
run-time values of location X; for example, PM(~) might denote “current soil mosture 
level > 6”. These values are drawn from a lattice so that degrees of partial information 
can be represented. The rconj operations are binary functions that take a pair of lattice 
values and combine them into a single lattice value summarizing their conjunctive 
content as precisely as possible. (The rconj* operation extends rconj to sets of lattice 
values in the natural way.) Using formulas in this way, the propositions that were merely 
implicit in the information of the machine can be made explicit and manipulated by the 
compiler. 
For each internal location b, the compiler computes two sets of runtime value terms 
ib and Nb defined as follows (the 0 symbol is the temporal logic operator representing 
“necessarily always”) : 
lb = {e (r t q init &(e)}, 
h$,={f?‘I rttl(P,,(al) r\...r\Pb,,(b,) +?WXt Pb(e’))}, 
where e’ = f( [al,. . . ,a,], [bl,. . . , b,] ). If we are initially ignorant of soil moisture, 
we might have only OPT, so ZM = (0). If our lower bound on moisture decreases 1 
per time step, then we might have q l( PM(~) + next PM( n - 1) ) . Each set Ib contains 
terms representing properties that can be proved from the background theory r to hold 
initially in the world. Each set Nb contains terms for properties that can be proved 
to hold “next”, given the properties that hold now as represented by the values of the 
input and state locations. If these sets are infinite, they can be generated and used 
incrementally. This is discussed more fully below. 
From these collections of sets the compiler computes the initial value of the state 
vector, uc, and its update function, f. The initial value is computed as follows: 
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In other words, the initial value of the state vector is the vector of values derived 
by rconj-ing values representing the strongest propositions that can be inferred by the 
compiler about the initial state of the environment in the “language” of each of the state 
components. Similarly, for the next state function: 
f([Q*. ..,~l,[h~...,b,,l) = Lrconj;l,(Nb,),...,rconj;jn(Nb.,)l. 
Here the compiler constructs a vector of expressions that denote the strongest proposi- 
tions about what will be true next, again in the language of the state components. 
In the case of the initial value, the rconj values can be computed at compile time 
because the values of all the arguments are available. In the case of the next state 
function, however, the rconj terms will not denote values known at compile time. Rather, 
they will generally be nested expressions containing operators that will be used to 
compute values at run time. Assuming the execution time of these operators is bounded, 
the depth of the expressions will provide a bound on the update time of the state vector. 
Without restricting the background theory, we cannot guarantee that the sets Ib and 
Nb will be finite. However, even in the unrestricted case the finiteness of terms in the 
language guarantees that whichever elements we can derive at compile time can be 
computed in bounded time at run time. Furthermore, the synthesis procedure exhibits 
strongly monotonic behavior: the more elements of It, and Mb we compute, the more 
information we can ascribe to run-time locations regarding the environment. This al- 
lows incremental improvements to be achieved simply by running the compiler longer; 
stopping the procedure at any stage will still yield a correct program, although not nec- 
essarily the program attuned to the most specific information available. Since, in general, 
additional rconj operations consume run-time resources, one reasonable approach would 
be to have the compiler keep track of run-time resources consumed and halt when some 
resource limit is reached. 
As we have observed, without placing restrictions on the symbolic language used to 
specify the background theory r, the synthesis method described above would hardly 
be practical; it is obvious that environment-description languages exist that make the 
synthesis problem not only intractable but undecidable. However, as with Gapps and 
other formalisms in the logic programming style, by restricting ourselves to certain 
stylized languages, practical synthesis techniques can be developed. 
We have experimented with a restriction of the logical language that seems to offer a 
good compromise between expressiveness and tractability. This restriction is to a weak 
temporal Horn-clause language resembling Prolog but with the addition of init and nRvt 
operators. The derivation process proceeds as described above using backward-chaining 
deduction techniques as the specific form of inference. A prototype system has been built 
implementing the Horn-clause version of the synthesis algorithm. One of the ways the 
language differs from Prolog is in the strong distinction between compile-time and run- 
time expressions. Compile-time expressions undergo unification in the ordinary manner; 
run-time expressions, by contrast, are simply accumulated and used to generate the 
final program. The RULER system was run on several small examples involving object 
tracking and aggregation, and the synthesis procedure has proved tractable in our test 
implementation. 
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Using off-line synthesis techniques, conditions that are semantically complex can still 
be recognized with limited machinery, and for this reason it is entirely consistent with 
the “reactive” bias to admit sophisticated semantic information and models. With some 
care, the designer can have the best of both worlds: declarative forms can be used to 
clarify the semantics of the domain representation, and finite parametric representations 
can be generated by the compiler to guarantee bounded-time updates and real-time 
response. 
3.2.2. Ruler exumple 
This section sketches out a simple example of a pure-perception system synthesized 
by the RULER system. Imagine that we again have a plant-watering robot, but we are 
now concerned with constructing its perceptual system so that it maintains, at all times, 
as much information as it can about the moisture level of a collection of plants. The 
representation used by the system must be able to accommodate uncertainty, so we use 
an interval, representing known lower and upper bounds on the true moisture level of 
the plant. This gives us our first rule, 
moisture (p, CO, maxI> . 
which states that the moisture of plant p is always between 0 and some maximum 
level. Additionally, if the robot is at the plant, it can get an approximate reading of the 
moisture level from its sensor: 
moisture(p, Cv-l,v+ll) :- 
at-plant (p, 1) , 
moisture_sensor(v). 
The at-plant (p, 1) term requires that the robot know that it is at plant p at the time the 
moisture is being sensed. In this case, there is an input bit, a, such that at-plant (n, a>. 
The robot has been constructed in such a way that if a has value 1, then the robot is 
known to be at plant n; if it has value 0, the robot is not known to be at that plant. We 
will treat other propositions similarly. 
The dynamics of the world are specified in terms of next rules. If we know that the 
robot’s last action was not to water the plant (either because we know it didn’t water or 
because we know it wasn’t at the plant), then the moisture may either increase (perhaps 
due to rain) or decrease by 1: 
next moisture(p, Cl-l,h+l]) :- 
not-watering(l), 
moisture(p, [l,h] > . 
next moisture(p, [l-l,h+l]) :- 
not-at-plant (p, 1) , 
moisture(p, [l,h] > . 
If we know that the robot did just water the plant, then the moisture will increase to its 
maximum level: 
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next moisture(p, [max,maxl> :- 
at_plant(p, I>, 
watering(l). 
If we don’t know whether the robot watered the plant (either because we don’t know 
whether it watered or because we don’t know whether it was at the plant), the bounds 
spread quickly: 
next moisture(p, Cl-1 ,maxl> : - 
moisture(p, [l,h]). 
Note that the last rule does not conflict with other rules that provide tighter bounds 
on the moisture. We combine the results of these rules by specifying an rconj rule for 
moisture. In this case, it is simply to intersect the intervals. Running RULER on this 
set of rules results in a circuit that retains as much information as possible about the 
moisture of the plant, given its inputs and the specified representation. 
3.2.3. Objects, properties, und relations 
While conceptually adequate for generating provably correct perceptual subsystems, 
at least for nonprobabilistic domain models, RULER is limited in that it makes no special 
provision for modeling worlds in which objects and their properties and relations are 
of special importance. This is the case, for example, in visual perception where objects 
move in and out of view, and a prime form of information to be extracted from the 
scene concerns the identity of objects and their spatial relations to one another and to the 
observer. To begin to address domains of this type, we developed an information-update 
schema we named Percm. 
The Percm schema can be thought of as a specialized form of RULER in which a 
finite, but shifting, set of objects is being tracked and described. The descriptions are 
represented as labeled graphs, with node labels representing unary properties of objects, 
and edge labels representing binary relations between objects. One of the objects is the 
agent, and the rest of the objects can vary, moving in and out of attentional focus. This 
scheme bears some relationship to the indexical-functional representations developed by 
Chapman and Agre for Pengi, but with rigorous correlation-based semantics. The node 
and edge labels are drawn from a space of data values representing lattice elements, 
just as in the RULER case, only now the propositional matrix is fixed (i.e., a fixed 
conjunction of properties and relations) and the lattice elements are constrained to be 
of semantic type property or relation, or to be coercible to such values. 
Fig. 5 shows the basic runtime data structures that underlie a Percm with n elements. 
There is a vector of length n, each of whose elements contains the unary properties of 
the ith element being tracked. Often, index 1 is reserved for the agent. In addition, there 
is an II x n matrix in which cell (i, j) contains the strongest representable information 
available about the relation between objects i and j. In many cases, the relations will 
be symmetric (or canonicalizable) so that only the upper triangle of the matrix needs 
to be explicitly represented. 
The update cycle for this data structure is similar to RULER'S, but in the Percm 
context, fixed background descriptions of the environment are provided not in the form 







Fig. 5. Data structures supporting an instance of the Percm schema with n objects. 
of propositional assertions about world-state transitions, but rather as rules, both temporal 




a set of operations used to update the data structures. These operations are: 
create: maps an input value to initial object properties and relations inferable from 
that input; 
propagate: strengthens properties and relations among objects x and y by deriving 
what can be inferred from existing properties and relations between each of x and 
y and some third object, z; 
merge: combines descriptions of objects x and y if their properties and relations 
imply that they are identical; 
aggregate: creates a new object y whose existence can be inferred from the exis- 
tence of constituent objects nt , . . . , x, with appropriate properties and relations, and 
initializes y’s description based on descriptions of constituents; 
degrade: maps properties and relations at time I to new values inferable for time 
t+ 1. 
The perceptual system is synthesized by composing and iterating these operations to 
update the object descriptions, with values again drawn from lattices to obtain grace- 
fully degrading approximations. Because Percm is a finite schema of bounded size, to 
complete the specification of an instance of the Percm schema, the designer must also 
define how, in the case of object over-how, objects are to be discarded or withdrawn 
from active attention. Circuitry to keep the data structures updated can be large, but is 
of bounded size. Operations like finding an empty cell for a new object can be done in 
a very shallow circuit with size O(n). 
3.2.4. Percm example 
In order to illustrate the ideas behind the Percm schema, we present a simple example 
of its operation. A mobile robot, traveling through a new environment, needs to construct 
a representation of the salient objects and their spatial relations. 
The robot might begin by perceiving, instantaneously, that there are two objects in 
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front of it: a chair and a person. It creates two objects, assigning them indices 2 and 3, 
stores some of their unary properties (such as type and color of the chair, gender and 
hair-color of the person) in cells P2 and P3, and stores bounds on the spatial relations 
between each one and the robot in Rt.2 and Rt,s. 
Immediately, a propagate operation can compute bounds on the spatial relations 
between objects 2 and 3 and store it in cell R 2,~. These objects can be neither merged 
nor aggregated. 
Finally, in the degrude step, knowledge about the generic motion abilities of chairs and 
people, as well as the current motion of the robot, is used to degrade the spatial relation 
information. The robot typically has good local odometry (motion information), so it 
knows how much it has moved relative to the position it was in when it first perceived 
these objects and can update RI,Z and R1.3 accordingly. If both of these objects were 
static, the robot could wander away and become confused about its relation to the 
objects, but still retain precise information about the relation of the objects to each 
other. However, in this case, people are far from static, so the degrade step will increase 
the bounds on all spatial relations between the person and other objects, because the 
person could potentially move in any direction, 
On the next cycle, the robot again sees the person, but because of its changed 
perspective, is able to measure the person’s height. This person gets created as object 
4 in the Percm data structures. This time, on the merge step, the robot is able to infer 
that, because of their close spatial positions (and perhaps because two people were not 
seen simultaneously), that objects 3 and 4 must really be the same. They are merged 
by conjoining their properties and their relations to other objects and storing them in a 
single index. The other index is marked as free. Now, the height and hair color are both 
known about a single person. 
The aggregate operation is useful when entire complex objects cannot be perceived 
instantaneously. Thus, a robot attempting to identify a large truck might individually 
identify wheels, a cab, and a flat bed, then aggregate them into a truck object. 
As the data structures begin to get full, it will be important to purge items in a useful 
way. Objects may be purged because their information is weak, or they are superseded 
by a complex object, or for a variety of attentional reasons based on the robot’s current 
goals. 
3.3. Combined perception and action 
The techniques illustrated in the two previous sections can be combined directly 
to synthesize control systems containing both perception and action components. For 
instance, using the Gapps approach, one could develop mappings from information 
states to actions, where the information states are the output of a perceptual subsystem 
synthesized using the RULER or Percm methodologies. If there were no interactions 
among design decisions needed for the two subsystems, the definition of the information 
state of the agent would act as a clean interface, and the combined system would exhibit 
the intended behavior. In general, however, there are interactions, and in this section we 
explore the nature of those interactions and potential methods of dealing with them. 
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The first problem is the specification of the information-state interface between the 
two modules. This problem exists even when the perceptual mechanism is degenerate. 
It is possible that the perceptual inputs from the environment do not provide enough 
information for the goal to be satisfied. Another difficulty arises if the information is 
available, but is encoded in such a way that the localization machinery is of intractable 
complexity. 
The design of the system becomes much more complex when the actions taken by 
the agent in the environment affect the information that will be available to it. When 
choosing action strategies, attention must be given to how actions chosen now will 
maintain the flow of information necessary for distinguishing among future states to be 
acted on. In AI, this problem often goes under the label of the knowledge precondition 
problem [ 111: it is not enough to be in an environmental state when a certain action 
is appropriate; the agent must know that it is in an environmental state in which that 
action is appropriate. 
The problem grows more complex when perceptual machinery distills information 
contained in the sensory input stream, and still more complex when the goal itself 
pertains to affecting the agent’s own information state. In these cases, the internal 
structure of the perception module is, from the point of view of the action-selection 
module, part of some external environment whose dynamic properties are critical to the 
success or failure of its strategy. Unfortunately, without elaborating the internal structure 
of the perception module first, statements of fact about this environment cannot be made, 
and hence no valid action strategy can be chosen. In general, action strategies intended 
to satisfy information goals can only coherently be developed in the context of fixed 
perceptual machinery, or, at least, in the context of articulated assumptions about the 
perceptual machinery. 
A natural development methodology, then, would be to design the perception module 
first, choosing conditions to be tracked and defining update circuitry that tracks these 
conditions in the passive sense introduced in the previous section, but does not guarantee 
the input streams that will force it to the right state. After defining this fixed machinery, 
an action strategy can be defined, relying on the definition of the perception component 
as if it were part of the environment. This strategy is designed to cause input streams 
flowing into the perception component to drive it into the appropriate states and actively 
makes use of constraints imposed by the previously chosen structure of the perception 
module. In principle, when perception and action modules are generated from declarative 
domain descriptions, a single set of facts about the environment should suffice to generate 
both modules. In other words, RULER-like state-transition rules, combined with operator- 
description-like action descriptions, contain enough constraints to generate systems that 
seek information. The RULER rules generate a perceptual system that maintains, as an 
invariant, correlations with conditions that the action system needs to test. This approach 
can involve a search, albeit at design time, for suitable conditions that can be effectively 
tracked. 
In all of these approaches, the result is an automaton with an objective informational 
relation to its environments, This is unlike the usual case in AI, in which knowledge pre- 
and post-conditions have been analyzed using theories that link internal states of agents 
to their environment only through stipulated semantic-denotation relations attributed by 
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designers somewhat arbitrarily to symbolic data. This distinction is substantial, and it is 
encouraging that many of the same semantic desiderata that have been pursued in tradi- 
tional AI planning and representation systems can be achieved in a more mechanistic, 
and potentially far more efficient, control-theoretic setting. 
A final area of complexity is the pervasive uncertainty found in natural environments. 
Throughout this work, we have modeled uncertainty using simple nondeterminism. While 
this allows designers and machines to avoid committing to information they do not 
possess, these models are extremely conservative in that they regard all alternative 
states that are not ruled out by hard constraints to be of equal importance. In real task 
domains, however, some of those alternatives are far more likely than others, and this 
fact is essential to the proper exploitation of the information. A model that is midway 
between deterministic and nondeterministic models is the probabilistic model in which 
state transitions, under a given input, are described by probability distributions. A natural 
mathematical model for such systems is the Markov process, which has been studied 
extensively by applied mathematicians. 
The difficulty in using probabilistic models together with the symbolic techniques 
described above is the nonmonotonicity of probabilities, which leads to noncomposi- 
tionality of the design technique. By conditioning on further evidence, the probability of 
a proposition can either be reduced or increased. This means that a designer cannot, in 
general, define a module of the perceptual component, prove a strong statement about 
the semantics of its outputs, and then proceed to use that module together with other 
modules; conditioning on the joint states of the modules may completely undermine 
the intended semantics of the first module. Furthermore, the action strategy embodied 
in the action-selection component is integral to the definition of the probabilistic state- 
transition matrix of the entire system. Just as before when we could not, in principle, 
define an action strategy before providing a fixed definition of the perception component, 
here we cannot define the perception component without constraining action first. The 
apparent circularity only points to the fundamental need to consider the agent as an 
integrated whole; the behavior of the entire system, agent plus environment, is deter- 
mined only when all the boundary conditions have been specified. Interim constraints 
and incremental refinement may be useful, but must be used cautiously, especially when 
modeling domains probabilistically. The theory of partially observable Markov deci- 
sion processes [ 1,9] provides a theoretically well-founded methodology for deriving 
controllers in stochastic domains, but it seems to be computationally very intractable. 
4. Conclusions 
The aim of situated-automata theory is to provide a new semantic perspective on 
intelligent agents. Traditional AI has been dominated by “reasoning” metaphors drawn 
from folk psychology in which programs are seen as actors manipulating linguistic 
elements, drawing conclusions from premises, and constructing representations of action. 
The semantics of these systems have been made rigorous, but are almost always imposed 
by their designers. Moreover, traditional models have often failed to explain how so much 
“reasoning” can get done so fast with so little hardware. Reactive-agent architectures 
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have been proposed as an alternative to traditional AI, but to date theoretical foundations 
for this work have been less developed. 
Situated-automata theory provides a semantic analysis of information processing that is 
intended to apply to all embedded control systems without requiring designer-conceived 
interpretations of machine state or computational models based on run-time inference. 
It is based on a direct mathematical model of how the states of natural processes, in 
the ways they unfold over time, reflect one another through intricate cross-dependencies 
and correlations that give rise to semantically meaningful states. The theory brings the 
semantic precision associated with traditional logic-based AI to the analysis of systems 
that are not structured as conventional reasoning systems at all. Nor are systems that do 
seem to “reason” excluded from this style of analysis; they are simply a special case. 
Note that none of this analysis is inconsistent with the construction of agents as sym- 
bolic systems; it simply makes explicit the constraints that must hold for their intended 
interpretation to be valid and provides methods for using symbolic characterizations as 
program specifications rather than as an implementation strategy. 
The shift from the traditional AI view to the situated view brings us to an outlook 
reminiscent of early cybernetic feedback models, but with more semantic subtlety and 
sophistication (derived from traditional symbolic AI) in describing conditions being 
tracked and controlled by an agent. In this view, the fundamental phenomenon to be 
explained is not “reasoning” but the mutual constraint exhibited between parts of a 
physical system over time. The key lies in understanding how a process can naturally 
mirror in its states subtle conditions in its environment and how these mirroring states 
ripple out to overt actions that eventually achieve goals. The fundamental questions 
include how the enormous set of discernible conditions can be modeled and grasped, 
how computational elements can be arranged to preserve distinctions that matter for 
controlling the environment while perhaps blurring others, and how can this be done in 
real time with high reliability using relatively modest computational resources. 
While the analytical approach presented here is very general in scope, its application 
to synthesis problems and to the design of particular systems remains quite challenging. 
In this paper we have attempted to sketch directions we regard as promising, primarily 
involving the use of stylized off-line symbolic reasoning to generate tractable run- 
time machinery with desired properties of information and control. Work remains to 
be done on the integration of automated learning techniques as well as the modeling 
and exploitation of statistical covariance in ways analogous to the discrete logic-based 
techniques presented here. 
Acknowledgments 
We derived a great deal of help and inspiration from our colleagues over the years 
of this project. Stanley Reifel built Flakey, an experimental mobile robot platform, and 
constantly challenged us to match in working software what we derived in elegant 
formulas. Sandy Wells brought a knowledge of computer vision, hardware, and hacking 
that was invaluable. Nathan Wilson implemented endless versions of and variations on 
Rex and wrote some crucial navigational code for Flakey. Stuart Shieber was a valuable 
172 S.J. Rosenschein, L.F? Kuelbling/Arti$cial Intelligence 73 (I 995) 149-l 73 
adjunct to the group and implemented natural language modules for the robot programs. 
Fernando Pereira was an important influence on the early development of situated- 
automata theory. David Chapman spent some summers with us and helped make Rex 
a much better language, through both ideas and implementation. He also worked on 
Ruler and some of its precursors. We are generally indebted to and appreciative of 
our colleagues at the Artificial Intelligence Center of SRI International, at Stanford 
University’s Center for the Study of Language and Information, and at Teleos Research. 
We gratefully acknowledge financial support from these institutions as well as from 
sponsors at the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency, the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, General Motors 


















A.R. Cassandra, L.P. Kaelbling and M.L. Littman, Acting optimally in partially observable stochastic 
domains, in: Proceedings AAAI-94, Seattle, WA ( 1994). 
J.Y. Halpem and Y. Moses, Knowledge and common knowledge in an distributed environment, in: 
Proceedings Third ACM Conference on Principles of Distributed Computing ( 1984) 50-61; revised 
version: IBM RJ 4421. 
G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell, An Introduction to Modal Logic (Methuen and Company, London, 
1968). 
L.P Kaelbling, Rex: a symbolic language for the design and parallel implementation of embedded 
systems, in: Proceedings AIAA Conference on Computers in Aerospace, Wakefield, MA (1987). 
L.P. Kaelbling, Goals as parallel program specifications, in: Proceedings AAAI-88, Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
MN (1988). 
L.P. Kaelbling, Compiling operator descriptions into reactive strategies using goal regression, Technical 
Report, Teleos Research, Palo Alto, CA ( 1991). 
L.P Kaelbling and S.J. Rosenschein, Action and planning in embedded agents, Rob. Autonomous Syst. 
6 ( I ) ( 1990) 3.5-48; also in: P Maes, ed., Designing Autonomous Agents: Theory and Practice from 
Biology to Engineering and Back (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991) 
L.F? Kaelbling and N.J. Wilson, Rex programmer’s manual, Technical Report 38 IR, Artificial Intelligence 
Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA (1988). 
W.S. Lovejoy, A survey of algorithmic methods for partially observed Markov decision processes, Ann. 
Oper. Res. 28 ( 1) ( 1991) 47-65. 
J. McCarthy and F?J. Hayes, Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence, 
in: B. Meltzer and D. Michie, eds., Machine Intelligence 4 (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
1969). 
R.C. Moore, A formal theory of knowledge and action, in: J.R. Hobbs and R.C. Moore, eds., Formal 
Theories of the Commonsense World ( Ablex, Norwood, NJ, 1985). 
A. Newell, The knowledge level, Artif: Infell. 18 (1982) 87-127. 
S.J. Rosenschein, Plan synthesis: a logical perspective, in: Proceedings IJCAI-81, Vancouver, BC ( 198 1); 
reprinted in: J.F. Allen, J. Hendler and A. Tate, eds., Readings in Planning (Morgan Kaufmann, San 
Mateo, CA, 1990). 
S.J. Rosenschein, Formal theories of knowledge in Al and robotics, New Gen. Comput. 3 (4) (1985) 
345-357. 
S.J. Rosenschein, Synthesizing information-tracking automata from environment descriptions, in: 
Proceedings International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 
Toronto, Ont. ( 1989). 
S.J. Rosenschein and L.P. Kaelbling, The synthesis of digital machines with provable epistemic 
properties, in: J.Y. Ha&m, ed., Proceedings of the Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning 
S.J. Rosenschein, L.P Kaelbling/Artificial Intelligence 73 (1995) 149-l 73 173 
About Knowledge (Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1986) 83-98; updated version: Technical Note 
412, Artificial Intelligence Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA. 
[ 171 R.J. Waldinger, Achieving several goals simultaneously, in: E.W. Elcock and D. Michie, eds., Machine 
Intelligence I3 (Ellis Horwood, Chichester, 1977); reprinted in: J.F. Allen, J. Hendler and A. Tate, eds., 
Readings in Planning (Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1990). 
